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Our products are safe (don’t tell anyone!). Why don’t supermarkets advertise 
their private food safety standards? 
 
  Abstract 
Large  retail  chains  have  spent  considerable  resources  to  promote  production  protocols  and 
traceability across the supply chain, aiming at increasing food safety. Yet, the majority of consumers are 
unaware of these private food safety standards (PFSS) and retailers are not informing them. This behavior 
denotes a pooling paradox: supermarkets spend a large amount of money for food safety and yet they forget 
to inform consumers. The result is a pooling equilibrium where consumers cannot discriminate among high 
quality and low quality products and supermarkets give up the potential price premium. This paper provides 
an  economic  explanation  for  the  paradox  using  a  contract-theory  model.  We  found  that  PFSS 
implementation  may  be  rational  even  if  consumers  have  no  willingness  to  pay  for  safety,  because  the 
standard can be used as a tool to solve asymmetric information along the supply chain. Using the PFSS, 
supermarkets can achieve a separating equilibrium where opportunistic suppliers have no incentive to accept 
the contract. 
Even if consumers exhibit a limited (but strictly positive) willingness to pay for safety, advertising 
may be profit-reducing. If the expected price margin is high enough, supermarkets have incentive to supply 
both certified and uncertified products. In this case, we show that, if consumers perceive undifferentiated 
products as “reasonably safe”, supermarkets may maximize profits by pooling the goods and selling them as 
undifferentiated. This result is not driven by advertising costs, as we derive it assuming free advertising.  
 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, large buyers – such as supermarkets – have put considerable effort in establishing 
private standards to ensure the safety of their products (Henson and Reardon, 2005). Yet, despite of 
the large investments, consumers seem to be mostly unaware of the very existence of these private 
food safety standards (PFSS) and supermarkets are not putting any significant effort in advertising 
and promotion (Hammoudi et al., 2009; Fulponi, 2006; Grunert, 2005; Rozan et al., 2004). This 
behavior denotes an apparent pooling paradox. Supermarkets invest a non-negligible amount of 
money to supply safer products but then they do not pursue a differentiation strategy as they do not 
advertise the standard nor inform consumers. Consumers’ lack of information determines a pooling 
equilibrium where certified and uncertified products are sold for the same (or very similar) price 
and supermarkets give up the potential price premium.  
The economic literature addressed the pooling paradox. For example, Rozan, Stenger and 
Willinger (2004) conclude that consumers perceive food safety to be a basic characteristic that they 
expect from all products and, hence, may not willing to pay a premium for it (see also Roosen, 2003; 
Giraud-Heraud et al., 2009). These explanations postulate that PFSS are adopted for other reasons in 
addition  to  food  safety,  as  there  is  no  economic  rationale  in  incurring  in  the  cost  of  providing 
attributes  that  consumers  do  not  want  to  pay  for.  In  this  regard,  Fulponi  (2006)  provides  an 
institutional analysis of PFSS and concludes that they can be used as a tool for governing the food 
system. 
Our paper contributes to this literature providing a theoretical model explaining the paradox. 
We reached two main results. Firstly, we find that PFSS implementation may be rational even if the 
consumers’ willingness to pay for safety is equal to zero, because the standard may be a tool to 
solve asymmetric information along the supermarket’s supply chain. Secondly, we find that, even if 
consumers exhibit a limited (but strictly positive) willingness to pay for safety, advertising may 
reduce expected profits if the supermarket optimal strategy consists in offering consumers a mix of 
standard and non-standard products. This result is not driven by advertising costs, as we derive it 
assuming free advertising, and requires that the retailers’ price margin is large and that consumers 
perceive undifferentiated products as “reasonably safe”.  
   3 
2. Food safety and private standard  
Over the past few years, food safety and quality has become an important concern for the 
general public, policy makers, researchers, stakeholders involved into food production, transport 
and trading. Even though the topic has been extensively studied and debated, a number of food 
crises over the past decade has brought the issue right back into the national and international 
political debate. While much of the focus of the economics literature has been on the role of public 
food safety and quality standards both as policy instruments and as non-tariff barriers to trade, it is 
evident that private standards are playing an increasing role in the governance of agricultural and food 
supply chain. In particular, retailers have implemented new collective and private norms in order to 
improve food safety and reduce the risks related to microbial contamination and pesticide residues.  
Firms  have  an  incentive  to  supply  safer  food,  but  the  implementation  of  food  safety 
standards can increase costs for firms. Nonetheless, firms have incentives to protect their reputation 
and  might  implement  state  of  the  art  food  safety  practices  without  any  pressure  from  the 
government. Some firms use international and private standards and certifiers in order to reduce the 
costs of verifying that suppliers are using safe production methods. 
 
2.1 Private standards and food supply chain 
In the context of global sourcing, it has become more common that downstream firms implement 
private food safety standards (voluntary) in order to improve the safety of final products. Private 
initiatives of standardization are mostly undertaken by big retails, processing industries and third 
part firms with high market power and a competitive strategy based on private standard to bind the 
company’s reputation on quality products.  
While  many  quality  characteristics  can  easily  be  used  by  retailers  to  differentiate  their 
products  in  the  final  market  this  is  not  straightforward  with  safety  characteristics.  Among  the 
options available to firms we focus on two main strategies: pure private standards and collective 
standards. Firms can implement firm-specific private standards that are defined, controlled and used 
by an individual retailer (Chain-specific standards set by a single company, e.g. Tesco Nature’s 
Choice and FilièresQualitéCarrefour) (Berdegué et al., 2005; Codron et al. 2005; Giraud-Héraud et 
al. 2006). Nevertheless, different types of collective standards have become progressively most 
important. In recent years several collective standards have been introduced by the food retailing 
industry, e.g. the BRC, IFS and Globalgap. These standards are business-to-business standard and 
the efforts are not communicated to consumers; the logo can only be placed on the pallets that will 
not be displayed at the point of sale. 
Indeed private standards enables a group of retailers to obtain goods that fulfill a more 
stringent standard than what is produced in existing spot markets by creating new intermediary 
markets rather than using supply contracts and potentially costly firm-specific private schemes. 
Private standards function as instruments for the coordination of supply chains by standardizing 
product requirements over suppliers, which may cover wide geographical regions that cut across 
national boundaries. This becomes of greater importance as supply chains become more global and 
are exposed to differing regulatory, economic and regulatory environments. In turn, standards act to 
reduce the transaction costs and risks associated with procurement, in particular where high levels 
of oversight are required to ensure food safety and/or quality attributes are delivered. 
A number of studies suggest that expected competitive advantages are important reasons for 
firms to embrace private standards (Henson and Caswell, 1999). But it is true that how the system of 
certification operates is the focus to understanding the allocation of costs and benefits throughout the 
supply chain. Certification is a process by which clients assess the compliance with defined standards 
and is typically undertaken by a third party agency that the client recognizes as ‘competent’.  
Standard protocols, such as GlobalGap and BRC, operate on a business-to-business basis 
and  are  not  consumer-facing.  In  case  supermarkets  or  retailers  ask  their  suppliers  for  these 
certifications, compliance with private standards becomes an addition to the list of services which 
retails are asked to suppliers as a condition of sustained market access. The control costs necessary   4 
to  private  standards  are  transferred  the  grower  and  the  exporter  upstream  the  supply  chain  by 
supermarkets and retailers. 
The supplier is fully responsible for supplying safe product, and the validation of safety 
systems should therefore be viewed as part of this responsibility. Final products on the market do 
not bear any logos to indicate that they are produced on a private standard scheme. Do consumers 
benefit from private food schemes? This question relates back to the question why consumers need 
private  food  schemes  and  whether  official  requirements  and  controls  alone  would  suffice  to 
guarantee food safety. As such consumers are not necessarily aware of the existence of standard and 
do not necessarily pay any price premium for it. Since there is no price premium for compliance 
with standard, supermarkets and retailers can well argue that they do not resort to private standard 
as a marketing strategy to attract consumers. In this sense, others food business operators can be 
suppliers of supermarkets and retails without incurring any extra costs. 
 
3. The model 
We developed a simple theoretical model to explain why a profit-maximizing supermarket may 
decide to implement a PFSS without extensive advertising to its customers. Our analysis concludes 
that  PFSS  can  be  used  as  a  supply  management  tool,  ensuring  that  suppliers  comply  with  an 
incomplete  contract  with  the  buyer  in  the  presence  of  asymmetric  information.  This  result  is 
independent of any impact that the PFSS may have on consumers. Furthermore, the theoretical 
model shows that a buyer facing stochastic prices, under specific conditions, maximizes profits by 
mixing products complying with the PFSS with other products during peak seasons. This strategy 
requires that consumers are not able to tell the difference between certified and uncertified products. 
Hence the advertising of the PFSS may not be efficient, since it makes consumer suspicious of 
uncertified, and potentially unsafe, food. 
We  apply  a  standard  principal-agent  setting  to  model  the  PFSS.  The  principal  is  a 
supermarket buying a product from farmers and selling it to the final consumers for an exogenous 
price PR. The profit of the supermarket depends on a “critical attribute”: if the attribute is missing 
the supermarket incurs in an expected profit loss D. Examples of such critical attribute are the 
compliance  with  the  logistic  requirement  of  the  supermarket’s  supply  chain  (timeliness  of  the 
delivery,  reliability,  etc.)  or  the  respect  of  public  safety  standards  as  imposed  by  the  current 
regulation. A key feature of our model is that the critical attribute may or may not concern the 
quality  or  safety  of  the  product.  It  is  sufficient  that  a)  the  lack  of  the  attribute  determines  an 
expected profit loss and b) the attribute is not freely observable by the supermarket.  
The farmers act as the agents of the model. We assume that there are M farmers in the 
market,  producing  one  unit  of  the  product  each.  The  farmers  are  homogenous  except  for  the 
parameter ci, representing their cost efficiency in delivering the critical attribute. The parameter is 
not observable by the supermarket and is uniformly distributed as ci∼U[0, cH]. The distribution of 
the parameter is public knowledge. Each farmer can sell the unit of product to the spot market for 
an exogenous price PM or deliver it to the supermarket for a price PS. If the farmer decides to 
deliver to the supermarket, then he/she can deliver the hidden attribute or behave opportunistically.  
We assume the existence of a spot market where an infinite number of small independent 
retailers compete with the supermarket. These independent retailers are passive players, buying one 
unit of the product from farmers for the price PM and selling it to consumers for the price PR. For 
simplicity, we impose a “no monopsony” assumption stating that the supermarket never acts as a 
monopsonist as there is always at least one independent retailer in the market.
1  
                                                 
1 We assume that M is large enough, so that n
* is always lower than M, where n
* is the profit-maximizing quantity 
traded by the supermarket. The assumption greatly simplifies the presentation of the results and does not affects the key 
findings. Furthermore, the absence of a monopolistic/monopsonistic retailer is consistent with observed reality. 
2  The  parameter  p  determines  the  expected  benefit  from  opportunism.  It  may  summarize  several  factors  such  as 
unrecoverable down-payments made by the supermarket, the probability that the opportunistic behavior goes undetected 
(for example if the supermarket can observe only the aggregate profit loss), or the probability that the supermarket 
cannot reject the delivery (for example because it cannot find another supplier on a short notice). We restricted the   5 
Prices PR and PM are assumed to be exogenously determined and stochastic. They follow a 
joint distribution such that the price margin PM = PR-PM is distributed as a random variable with 
mean E(PM) and variance ! PM
2 . We assume that, in the absence of advertising, the PFSS do not 
affect the consumers’ willingness to pay for the goods so that the independent retailers and the 
supermarket are exposed to the same retail price. The price distributions are public knowledge and 
all players are risk-neutral. 
We  represent  the  supply  contract  using  a  simple  principal-agent  model.  At  time  t0  the 
supermarket  offers  nC  contracts  to  randomly  selected  farmers.  The  supermarket  offers  a  price 
PM+Δ, where Δ is a price premium and requires the delivery of products with the critical attribute at 
time t1. The nC farmers under contract must decide if they will deliver the attribute or if they will 
behave  opportunistically.  The  expected  payoff  from  opportunism  is  PM+p⋅Δ,  with  p  ∈(0,  1).
2 
Summarizing the strategy sets of the supermarket and the i
th farmers are, respectively, SS[nC, nM, Δ] 
and Si[AR, OPP], where nM is the quantity of product that the supermarkets buys on the spot market, 
AR and OPP are binary variables with AR=1 if the farmer accepts the contract and zero otherwise 
and OPP = 1 if the farmer behaves opportunistically and zero otherwise. 
At time t1 production is revealed. The nC farmers under contract will deliver the products to 
the supermarkets and the other M-nC farmers will sell their product to the independent retailers. 
Assuming that the cost function is separable in the price of the product, the buyer expected 
payoff is: 
(1)  , 
where nC is the number of contracts offered by the buyer, which is equal to the quantity produced 
since each farmer produces one unit, z is the probability that a farmer behaves opportunistically. 
C(n) is the buyer marketing cost function, which is assumed to be  . 
Farmer i’s expected payoff is: 
(2)   
From equation (2), the farmer’s individual rationality (IR) constraint requires Δ≥0 and the incentive 
compatibility (IC) constraint is satisfied if  .  
Since  the  cost  parameter  ci  is  uniformly  distributed,  the  probability  of  contracting  an 
opportunistic farmer (i.e, with ci >  ) is  and the problem of the buyer is: 
 
subject to: 
                                                 
2  The  parameter  p  determines  the  expected  benefit  from  opportunism.  It  may  summarize  several  factors  such  as 
unrecoverable down-payments made by the supermarket, the probability that the opportunistic behavior goes undetected 
(for example if the supermarket can observe only the aggregate profit loss), or the probability that the supermarket 
cannot reject the delivery (for example because it cannot find another supplier on a short notice). We restricted the 
parameter to the interval (0,1) because for p=0 there is no incentive for opportunistic behavior. For p≥1 the model is 
undetermined, as there is no incentive for delivering the attribute. In this case, the key findings of this paper can still be 
derived using an infinitely repeated game, under the assumption that the supermarket can punish the opportunistic 
farmers by refusing to offer them contracts forever.  
E ! S ( )= nC E PM ( )" # " z $D % & ' ( + nM E PM ( )" D % & ' (" CS nC + nM ( )
C nC + nM ( )= a! nC + nM ( )
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where inequality (a) is the farmer’s IR constraint, inequality (b) states the buyer is rational and does 
increase the price premium beyond the level corresponding to z =1, inequalities (c) are the usual 
non-negativity constraints on quantities. The farmer IC constraint has been substituted into the 
objective function.  
The supermarket’s optimal strategy depends on the sign of the derivative of the objective 
function with respect to Δ: 
, 
where   , i. e., the incentive price for the most inefficient farmers. 
If D is larger than  , the derivative is always positive and the marginal benefit of reducing 
the probability of opportunistic behavior is greater than the marginal cost of increasing the price 
premium. In this case, constraint (b) is binding, the buyer offers the optimal price premium 
and no farmer has incentive to behave opportunistically. If D is smaller than  , the derivative is 
negative and the buyer maximizes profits by setting the price premium to zero and incurring in the 
loss of D for each unit of product (i.e., acting as an independent retailer). The strategy of the buyer 
is driven by the relative magnitude of the expected profit loss from the opportunism and the price 
premium. If the expected loss is large, the buyer uses contracts (and incentive pricing) to organize 
the supply chain. If the expected loss is small, the buyer organizes the transaction using the spot 
market.  If  the  price  margin  is  negative  the  supermarket  exits  the  market.  Table  1  reports  the 
supermarket’s optimal strategy SS !
*,nC
*,nM
* " # $ %and the corresponding payoff π
*. 
 
Table 1: Supermarket’s optimal strategy in the absence of PFSS 
  Optimal strategy 
  Exit  Act as indep. retailer  Exit  Contracts 
Range 
       
       
Δ
*  0  0     
  0  0  0   
  0    0  0 
  0    0   
 
3.1 The PFSS as supply management tools. 
In this section we show that the buyer can improve profits by imposing a PFSS to farmers, even if 
the standard itself does not affect consumer demand. In the typical literature about PFSS, the buyer 
benefits from the adoption of the standard because of consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality and 
safety. In our model, we show that the PFSS can be used as a self-selecting device ensuring that 
opportunistic farmers have no incentive to subscribe the contract with the buyer.  
We  assume  the  adoption  of  the  standard  requires  that  farmers  bear  an  observable 
implementation cost K, which is equal for all farmers. The payment of the cost K is a pre-requisite 
for being offered a contract. In this setting the expected payoff for the i-th farmer is:  
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(3)    
We  assume  also  that  the  function  K=f(PFSS),  linking  the  implementation  cost  to  the 
technical provisions of the PFSS, is public knowledge. The supermarket can set the implementation 
cost K strategically, in order to create a separating equilibrium where the inefficient farmers opt out 
of the contract. Therefore if a PFSS is adopted the strategy of the supermarket is defined as the set 
. 
The  separating  equilibrium  requires  that  the  expected  payoff  is  negative  if  the  farmer 
behaves  opportunistically  and  positive  otherwise,  i.e.,  and  .  These 
conditions are satisfied for any pair: 
(4)  ! ! " ci 1# p ( )
#1and  ! K ! p" ! #, ! # $ci % & ' (. 
Figure 1 illustrates the result in the contract space. The shaded area represents the pairs of Δ 
and K that prevent farmers from adopting opportunistic behavior.  
 
Figure 1: Representation of the efficient contract in contract space. The dimensions of the 
contract are the price premium (Δ) and the implementation cost of the PFSS (K). 
 
 
If the pair [Δ, K] satisfies conditions (4), the probability z of incurring in opportunistic behavior is 
zero,  because  the  inefficient  farmers  have  no  incentive  to  join  the  contract.  The  supermarket 
expected payoff adopting the PFSS is:  
(5)  E !S |PFSS ( ) = nC E PM ( )!" # $ % &+nM E PM ( )! D # $ % &!a nC +nM ( )
2
 
and the problem of the principal is: 
 subject to: 
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where   is the share of producers that are willing to accept the contract, since farmers 
with ci>(1-p)Δ have no incentive to join. Constraint (a) states the price premium Δ must be high 
enough  to  elicit  supply.  Because  the  supermarket’s  only  incentive  to  pay  a  price  premium  is 
eliciting supply, at the optimum the constraint is satisfied with equality.  
The solution of the maximization problem gives two possible optimal strategies, depending 
on the value of the parameter D.
 3 The results are summarized in Table 2. If D is large enough, the 
supermarket organizes the supply using contracts only. If D is small, the supermarket uses a mix of 
contracts and spot-market purchases. In this latter case, the supermarket sets a small price premium, 
elicits a small supply for contract production and uses the spot market up to the optimal production 
level.  
 
Table 2: Supermarket optimal strategy if the PFSS is adopted 
  Optimal strategy 
  Mix contracts and spot market  Contracts only 
  (PFSS/Mix)  (PFSS/Contract) 
Range     
Δ
*  D/2   
     
    0 
 
   
With  ,  .
4 
 
Simple (yet tedious) algebra shows that the PFSS strategies always dominate the no-PFSS 
strategies. The intuition behind this result is straightforward as the optimal strategy without PFSS 
lies in the set of the admissible solutions for a supermarket using PFSS. Therefore, the level of 
expected of the profits from PFSS strategies is at least the same as the no-PFSS strategies. The 
adoption of the PFSS solves the information asymmetry at no cost for the principal, as the adoption 
cost is paid by the farmers.  
Compared to the no-PFSS strategies, the supermarket must pay a smaller information rent to 
the  farmers  and  gains  higher  profits.  This  result  was  obtained  under  general  assumptions:  the 
existence  of  a  critical  attribute,  asymmetric  information  regarding  farmers’  efficiency  and  the 
delivery of the attribute, the possibility of imposing ex-ante an observable cost with the PFSS. The 
PFSS increases expected profits even if consumers have no willingness to pay for the increased 
quality and safety attributes of the certified products.  
This conclusion provides an explanation for the pooling paradox. If the supermarket cannot 
charge a price premium, there is no incentive to advertise. Yet, we can still observe PFSS, as they 
are a device solving information asymmetry along the supply chain. 
 
                                                 
3 Noticeably, if the PFSS is adopted, the exit strategy is strictly dominated by the contract strategy, since 
. Once the information asymmetry is solved, contracting always offer profit opportunity. 
4 φ is the optimal share of farmers that are offered a contract in the PFSS/Contract strategy, λ/2 is the optimal share of 
E(PM) that is offered to farmers as price premium. Because of the no-monopsony assumption, both φ and λ are bound 
in the interval [0,1). 
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4. To advertise or not to advertise. 
In this section we relax the assumption that consumers are not willing to pay a premium for the 
certified products. We show that advertising does not necessarily increase expected profits even if 
consumers exhibit strictly positive willingness to pay for safety and advertising cost is zero. The 
intuition behind this conclusion is straightforward: if the supermarket’s profit-maximizing strategy 
is mixing certified and uncertified products, under specific conditions (that will be derived later on 
in the paper) it is possible that advertising reduce the expected profits on the uncertified products 
more than it increases the returns on the certified products.  
Assume that in a differentiated market, where consumers are informed about PFSS, the 
expected price margin of the uncertified product isE PMU ( ) = E PM ( )! Z and the expected price 
margin of the certified products is  E PMC ( ) = E PM ( )+ Z !" , with Z>0, β≥0 and E(PM) is the 
price of the good in a pooling equilibrium. In our modeling, the parameter Z represents the “safety 
concern effect” and it is the discount that consumers require to buy products that are advertised as 
“less safe”. The product Zβ is the “value-added effect” and denotes the consumers’ willingness to 
pay for the improved food safety.
5 We want to show that it exists a strictly positive value  !
*such 
that for any β∈[0,β
*] advertising is not a dominant strategy, even if advertising is free. This result 
implies that it exists a set of market conditions such that free advertising is not profit-enhancing 
even if consumers have a strictly positive willingness to pay for PFSS. 
 
Table 3: Optimal strategy for an advertising supermarket 
  Optimal strategy 
  Mixing contracts and spot market  Contracts only 
  (ADV/Mix)  (ADV/Contract) 
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To show this result we find the supermarket’s optimal strategy, conditioned to advertising, 
and then we compared the expected profits with the no-advertising case, as reported in Table 2. Our 
goal  is  to  show  that  it  exists  a  non-empty  set  of  parameter  values  such  that 
, where the right-hand side of the inequality represents the expected 
                                                 
5 The parameter β may be interpreted as the consumers’ perception of food safety in the absence of advertising. β=0 
implies that, in the absence of advertising, the consumers consider all products as safe and they take safety as granted. 
In this case, the only effect of the advertising is to make them aware of the existence of unsafe products. High values of 
β, instead, imply that the consumers are aware that products might be unsafe and the PFSS can increase the value of the 
product. The parameter Z can be interpreted as a measure of consumers’ concern for safety and quality. The higher the 
value of Z, the more valuable the certified products are compared to the uncertified products. 
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profits without advertising and the left-hand side is the expected profits with advertising, which are 
defined as: 
 
Similarly  to  the  no-advertising  case,  the  advertising  supermarket  must  maximize  the 
objective function under the constraints: 
 
Table 3 reports the solution of the optimization program.  
The comparison of the results in Table 2 and Table 3 shows that the ADV/Contract strategy 
weakly dominates the PFSS/Contract strategy in the admissible parameter range. If the supermarket 
offers only certified products, free advertising increases profits unless either Z or β are equal to 
zero.  
The  strategy  ADV/Mix  weakly  dominates  the  strategy  PFSS/Mix  only  if  !   is  large  enough 
compared to E(PM). In fact, the difference in the expected profits is: 
E !s | ADV / Mix ( )! E !s |PFSS / Mix ( ) =
Z
2a
2D+ Z ( ) " + Ma ( )+ 2D+ Z 2+ ! ( ) # $ % &Ma!
2"










The difference is negative for any: 
(6)   E PM ( ) >
2D + Z ( ) ! + Ma ( )+ 2D + Z 2 + " ( ) # $ % &Ma"
2!
,  
which means that for high values of the expected price margin, the profit loss from the reduction in 
the sale price of the uncertified products more than offsets the profit gain from the increase in the 
sale price of the certified goods. 
Noticeably,  inequality  (6)  implies  that  the  threshold  value  of  !
*that  makes  advertising 
profitable  is  strictly  positive.  In  fact,  for  β  =0,  the  strategy  ADV/Mix  dominates  the  strategy 
PFSS/Mix if and only if: 
E PM ( ) <
2D + Z ( ) ! + Ma ( )
2!
, 
but the values of E(PM) which satisfy the inequality are outside the admissible parameter space for 
the ADV/Mix strategy. Therefore  !
*must be greater than zero. This result implies that a strictly 
positive consumers’ willingness to pay for safety is not a sufficient condition for advertising to be 
profitable. 
Basic  algebra  shows  that  a  similar  result  holds  for  the  range 
E PM ( )!
D " + a#M ( )
"
,










,  where  the  optimal  strategies  are 
PFSS/Mix in the absence of advertising and ADV/Contract if the supermarket advertises the PFSS. 
Our simple model shows that if the expected price margin is high, the supermarket may 
have incentive to sell a mix of certified and uncertified products. As consumer cannot tell the two 
kinds  of  goods,  advertising  (e.g.,  labeling  or  promotion)  is  necessary  to  implement  a  product-
differentiation strategy. Our model shows that product differentiation may allow the supermarket to 
extract profit from consumers’ willingness to pay for safety, but may reduce profits on the sales of 
the uncertified products, if consumers demand a discount on the potentially unsafe goods. If the 
latter effect prevails on the former, advertising reduces expected profits. The model shows that 
advertising is not rational if the expected price margin is high and the consumers’ consider the 
undifferentiated products “reasonably safe” (i.e., β is small). This conclusion offers an explanation 
of the pooling paradox: if the above mentioned conditions are met, we can observe PFSS’s, because 
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2
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of their value of supply management tools, but we do not observe advertising, as the supermarkets 
have no incentive to promote product differentiation. 
 
Conclusions 
Supermarket are actively promoting their PFSS among suppliers, yet they do not put any significant 
effort to bring the improved food safety to consumers’ attention. Our paper presented a theoretical 
model explaining this apparent paradox. We found that the supermarket behavior can be rational if 
consumers’ willingness to pay for quality does not exceed a threshold  Z!
*that is a function of the 
expected price margin and other parameters. In particular, our theoretical model supports two major 
conclusions. Firstly, we showed that PFSS can be used to solve asymmetric information problems. 
Consequently, their scope goes beyond exploiting consumers’ demand for safety, as they can be 
used as institutional arrangement to organize the supply chain. In this context, the adoption of PFSS 
is rational even if consumers have no willingness to pay for safety. 
  Secondly, we showed that advertising the PFSS (and the higher quality of the certified 
products) might reduce supermarkets’ profits, under specific circumstances. If the expected price 
margin is high enough, supermarkets have incentive to mix certified and uncertified products. In 
such instances and if consumers’ willingness to pay for safety does not exceed  Z!
*, supermarkets 
may benefit from pooling the goods and selling them as undifferentiated. In this way they avoid the 
losses from selling uncertified (and potentially unsafe) products. 
  These two results provide a possible economic justification to the existence of unadvertised 
PFSS  and  they  suggest  that  the  adoption  of  such  standards  is  not  driven  by  the  concern  for 
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